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Abstract: Coined the “trial of the century” in sovereign debt litigation, NML v.
Argentina (NML) involves a radical departure from the traditional unenforceability of
sovereign debt contracts in favor of the opposite extreme: enforcement through potent
injunctive remedies applicable to third parties. Problems with the NML precedent
could extend far beyond Argentina’s immediate situation. NML is the latest landmark
in a trend that creates serious uncertainties for sovereign debt markets—a major
concern for sovereigns, their creditors, and financial institutions around the world.
This Article argues that NML creates “bad law” by overcompensating for
unenforceability problems with an ambitious reading of the pari passu clause and
supercharged injunctive remedies. As a practical matter, the milk is spilled; “rogue”
precedent now exists. But until broader solutions for problems in sovereign debt are
available, there are compelling grounds for other courts to apply the NML precedent
as narrowly as possible. In addition to the extraordinary factual circumstances of
NML, the Second Circuit provided a starting point for distinguishing NML from future
cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION: SOVEREIGN DEBT’S “TRIAL OF THE
CENTURY”
Fifty-three trillion dollars and counting reads the Economist’s Global
Debt Clock, which tracks global public debt.1 Government debt represents
a hefty portion—roughly a fifth of financial assets worldwide.2 Foreignheld sovereign debt is worth trillions of dollars and is an increasingly vital
component of international finance.3 Beyond the trillions of dollars at
stake, sovereign debt impacts the lives of billions of people with important
social and economic consequences.4 Sovereign debt holdings also play an
important stabilizing role in the portfolios of pension funds, central banks,
and institutional investors around the world.5 Trends in sovereign debt
have crucial consequences around the world for human welfare, political
stability, financial systems, and even national security.6
Unfortunately, sovereign debt defaults are more than hypothetical
disaster scenarios in waiting; they are already a serious problem.7 Debt
1
World Debt Comparison: The Global Debt Clock, ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/
content/global_debt_clock (last visited July 28, 2014).
2
See SUSAN LUND ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION: RETREAT OR
RESET? 14 (2013).
3
Emerging market debt held by foreign interests is worth $1 trillion. See Serkan Arslanalp &
Takahiro Tsuda, Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt 4 (IMF, Working
Paper WP/14/39, 2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1439.pdf.
Advanced economy debt held by foreign interests grew from $5 to $14 trillion between 2004 and 2011.
See Serkan Arslanalp & Takahiro Tsuda, Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign
Debt 23 (IMF, Working Paper WP/12/284, 2012), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/wp/2012/wp12284.pdf. Foreign holders of U.S. sovereign debt account for almost $6 trillion of the $17.6
trillion total. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF TREASURY SECURITIES (2014),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/ mfh.txt; U.S. DEP’T. OF
TREAS., Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, TREASURYDIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP
/debt/current (last updated Jan. 8, 2015).
4
See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, 100 AM. ECON.
REV. 573, 573–78 (2010), available at http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/growth-debt.pdf
(explaining frictions between growth rates and rising sovereign debt); see also Manmohoan S. Kumar &
Jaejoon Woo, Public Debt and Growth 27 (IMF, Working Paper WP/10/174, 2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10174.pdf (projecting that U.S. debt will cost
Americans $2.4 trillion in lost growth over the next five years).
5
See PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT INITIATIVE, SOVEREIGN BONDS: SPOTLIGHT ON
ESG RISKS 4 (2013), available at http://www.unpri.org/publications/.
6
See generally Francis E. Warnock, How Dangerous Is U.S. Government Debt?, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 2010), http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/dangerous-us-governmentdebt/p22408. See also Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and
Borrowing, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 64, 69–70 (2010) (addressing social costs and
intergenerational tensions in sovereign debt).
7
Between 1950 and 2010, there were 600 sovereign debt restructurings in ninety-five countries,
sometimes with disastrous economic and social consequences. See Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Debt
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defaults tend to plague middle income and highly indebted poor countries
(HIPCs).8 However, debt crises in the eurozone show that this vulnerability
extends beyond emerging markets.9 Recent events in the United States
even illustrated the potential for politically manufactured sovereign
defaults.10 Increasingly in question is the common assumption that
advanced economies are completely different than emerging markets in
terms of available policy solutions in managing unsustainable debt
burdens.11
Sometimes likened to a Greek tragedy, Argentina’s troubled history
with sovereign debt goes back centuries.12 The latest chapter began in late
2001 when Argentina suspended payments on roughly $100 billion in
sovereign bonds—the largest sovereign debt default in world history.13
After contentious restructuring negotiations, Argentina eventually
exchanged most of its defaulted bonds for new debt, but not before a
significant number of bonds were acquired by distressed-debt hedge funds,
often referred to as “vulture” funds, which specialize in acquiring cheap,
distressed debt and subsequently litigating for a profit.14
In 2012, a lawsuit led by vulture hedge funds resulted in the Southern
District of New York’s groundbreaking decision in NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina (NML).15 Plaintiffs successfully sued Argentina for
Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 5–6 (IMF, Working Paper
WP/12/203, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ecosoc/debt/2013/IMF_wp12_203.pdf.
8
See Julian Schumacher et al., Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 19762010 12 (Feb. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.scu.edu/business/
economics/upload/SovereignDefaultsinCourt.pdf; see also IMF & INT’L DEV. ASSOC., HEAVILY
INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE — PERSPECTIVES ON THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK AND
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (Apr. 2, 1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/
options/options.pdf (providing background on the HIPC Initiative, which was launched in 1996).
9
For extensive coverage of the eurozone crisis, see The Euro Zone: That Sinking Feeling (Again),
ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2014, at 10.
10
See Nicole Hong, U.S. Debt Rating Put on Watch by Fitch, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2013, 8:08 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579137851778625112?mod=_
newsreel_3.
11
See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some
Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten (IMF, Working Paper WP/13/266, 2013), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13266.pdf.
12
See Bob Van Voris, Argentina ‘Greek Tragedy’ Nears End as Debt Ruling Looms, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-31/argentina-greek-tragedy-nears-end-as-debt
-ruling-looms.
13
See J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41029, ARGENTINA , CONG. RESEARCH SERV.1303-31 5 (2013).
14
See id. (“A diverse group of ‘holdouts’ representing $18.6 billion did not tender their bonds and
some have opted to litigate instead.”). For the sake of brevity, distressed debt hedge funds are at times
referred to as “vulture” funds in this Article.
15
See Sovereign Debt: Hold-outs Upheld, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 2012, at 74–75, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21565635-court-ruling-against-argentina-has-
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the breach of a pari passu or “equal footing” covenant,16 obtaining potent
injunctive remedies to enforce the judgment against Argentina and sending
shockwaves through sovereign debt markets.17 Plaintiffs won again,
decisively, in a Second Circuit appeal.18 The Supreme Court then denied
Argentina’s petition for review of the Second Circuit’s interpretation of
Argentina’s pari passu obligations.19
NML creates uncertainties for sovereign debt markets with problematic
consequences for sovereign borrowers, their creditors, and third parties
involved in international financial services.20 Exchange bondholders have
been caught in the crossfire as well.21 NML’s radical solution to
unenforceability problems could complicate sovereign debt restructuring.22
Also, New York is a critical jurisdiction, not just for sovereign debt but also
for corporate debt issuances.23 Thus, for good reason, the Financial Times
suggests that NML is the “the trial of the century” in sovereign debt
litigation.24
Scholars and practitioners alike have analyzed the recent evolution of
sovereign debt law, which has undergone important changes in the last few
implications-other-governments-hold-outs.
16
Though the Latin phrase pari passu literally means “in equal step,” its legal meaning in sovereign
debt contracts is the subject of considerable debate. Most pari passu clauses provide that a debtor will
maintain equal footing among obligations. See infra notes 201–11 and accompanying text.
17
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2012 WL 5895784 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
21, 2012), appeal dismissed, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013) (granting specific performance and permanent
injunctions). See Sujata Rao, Investment Focus – Argentine Case Adds to Sovereign Debt Doubts,
REUTERS (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/23/investment-focus-idUSL5E8
MN83Y20121123.
18
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).
19
See Camila Russo & Katia Porzecanski, Argentine Bonds Plunge After U.S. Court Rejects Apeeal
[sic], BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-16/argentine-bondsplunge-after-u-s-supreme-court-rejects-appeal.html.
20
See Brief of the American Bankers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Nonparty, the Bank of
New York Mellon at 14–15, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir.
Jan. 4, 2013); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae the Clearing House Ass’n L.L.C. in Support of Reversal
at 25–27, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013).
21
Exchange bondholders participated in the restructuring of Argentina’s sovereign debt, taking a loss and
exchanging their bonds for new ones rather than holding out and litigating. See Vivianne Rodrigues & John
Paul Rathbone, Argentina Bond Investors Challenge Long Arm of US Law, FIN. TIMES (July 3, 2014, 5:47
PM), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/471b5be2-02c7-11e4-a68d-00144feab7de.html.
22
Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of
Argentina’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 3, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L), 2012 WL 6777132, at *3 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012); Brief for the United
States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 17–18, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic
of Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2012).
23
See Das et al., supra note 7, at 41 (illustrating that New York law governs $272 billion out of a
total of $411 billion in emerging market sovereign bonds, representing 435 issuances out of a total of
631 issuances).
24
Joseph Cotterill, Pari Passu Saga, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE BLOG, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/tag/
pari-passu-saga/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
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decades.25 For example, quantitative studies have measured the rise in
sovereign debt litigation.26 A wide range of economic issues in sovereign
debt have been explored over the last several decades.27 Existing literature
has documented the history and debate on the meaning of pari passu—the
covenant at the heart of the most recent and disruptive wave of sovereign
debt litigation.28 This Article builds on existing literature by analyzing
NML within the context of “rogue” trends in sovereign debt and developing
practical arguments to support a narrow application of NML.29
“Bad facts make bad law,” goes the old common law axiom. NML
brings that cliché to life. Faced with bad facts, the NML court made bad
law to punish an uncooperative sovereign defendant. In doing so, the court
resorted to drastic measures, relying on enforcement against innocent third
parties through injunctive remedies. As a result, NML creates major
uncertainties for sovereign debt markets. Unfortunately, NML is unlikely to
remain an isolated occurrence. Faced with unenforceability and essentially
rendered powerless to compel payment by unwilling sovereign defendants,
other courts have succumbed—as future courts likely will—to the
temptation of injunctive remedies.
There are compelling grounds for a narrow approach regarding NML’s
precedential value. Not only is NML an unsuitable point of departure with
exceptional factual circumstances, the Second Circuit opinion explicitly
provides textual grounds for distinguishing NML from future cases. NML is
a true factual outlier. Although the Second Circuit partially recognized
Argentina as a “uniquely recalcitrant” debtor, NML represents the most
exceptional sovereign debt situation in modern history.30 Until broader

25

See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53
EMORY L.J. 869, 877–91 (2004) (detailing the emergence and proliferation of pari passu litigation in
sovereign debt); see also Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Understanding the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign
Debt Instruments: A Complex Quest, 43 INT’L LAW 1217 (2009) [hereinafter Olivares-Caminal, Quest];
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That Is the Question in
Sovereign Bonds After the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 745 (2009)
[hereinafter Olivares-Caminal, Rank].
26
See, e.g., Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 11.
27
For a review of recent economic literature on sovereign debt, see Ugo Panizza et al., The Economics and
Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651, 659–64 (2009). For interpretations of
empirical data on sovereign debt and sovereign defaults, see id. at 664–93.
28
See G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 650 (2001) (making
the case against the ratable payment approach to pari passu); FIN. MKTS. L. COMM., ANALYSIS OF THE
ROLE, USE AND MEANING OF PARI PASSU CLAUSES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT OBLIGATIONS AS A MATTER OF
ENGLISH LAW 17, n.31 (2005) [hereinafter FMLC STUDY], available at http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/
2/6/5/8/26584807/79.pdf (clarifying that the meaning of pari passu under English law does not support
the ratable payment approach).
29
See Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s
Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 316–17 (2005).
30
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d. Cir. 2013).
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solutions are implemented, a narrow application of NML is the most
desirable of available options to mitigate the consequences of a rogue trend
in sovereign debt litigation. In supporting this position, this Article
underscores the hazards of perfect storms in sovereign debt—where rogue
creditors, rogue debtors, and rogue court decisions converge to create
undesirable and destabilizing precedent in a crucial area of the law.
This Article is organized as follows: Part II provides background on
the law of sovereign debt, restructuring practices, and the current
environment for sovereign debt litigation. Part III sets forth the exceptional
nature of Argentina’s situation across the various stages of sovereign debt.
Part IV analyzes Argentina’s pari passu clause and the NML decision.
Building on language from the Second Circuit’s opinion, Part V justifies a
narrow reading and limited application of NML to future sovereign debt
cases.
II. THE EVOLVING LAW OF SOVEREIGN DEBT
For good reason, sovereign debt is often characterized as
unenforceable.31 Courts generally lack effective enforcement and collection
mechanisms required to hold accountable unwilling sovereigns.32 In
nonsovereign, “normal” situations, the remedy for a failure to repay debt is
typically a money judgment enforceable with asset seizures. In sovereign
debt, assets are often beyond the reach of creditors because collection is
complicated if not impossible.33 Sovereigns usually have few, if any,
commercial assets outside of their own borders for creditors to attach.34
Moreover, military options available in extraordinary situations during the
era of “gunboat diplomacy” are no longer available to powerful creditor
nations.35
31
See Anna Gelpern, Contract Hope and Sovereign Redemption, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 132, 132 (2013)
[hereinafter Gelpern, Contract Hope] (“Sovereign debt is unenforceable.”).
32
See EDWIN BORCHARD, 1 STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS 122 (1951); see also
Gelpern, Contract Hope, supra note 31, at 133.
33
See Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 25, at 1220; see also Gelpern, Contract Hope, supra
note 31.
34
Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation:
Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 59 (2010); see also
William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1 passim (2004) (describing challenges associated with enforcing claims against
sovereign debtors).
35
Historically, creditors could turn to their home governments to intervene on their behalf in such
disputes. Many such requests were made in vain, but several instances of dramatic military
interventions exemplify the era of gunboat diplomacy: 1880–1913. Compare MICHAEL TOMZ,
REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007), with Kris J. Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, Supersanctions and
Sovereign Debt Repayment, 29 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 19 (2010).
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This Part provides background information on the law of sovereign
debt, restructuring practices, and the current environment for sovereign debt
litigation. First, this Part briefly explains increasing pressures on the
unenforceability of sovereign debt contracts. Second, this Part assesses the
current environment of sovereign debt litigation and the role of distressed
debt hedge funds in recent legal developments. Third, this Part addresses
the legal nature of sovereign debt restructuring in the absence of sovereign
insolvency mechanisms.
A. Unenforceability Under Fire
Following the Latin American debt crises in the 1980s, sovereign debt
markets underwent an important shift under the Brady Plan from syndicated
lending to bond financing.36 During the syndicated lending era, sovereigns
typically borrowed from commercial banks under a single loan agreement.37
Under the Brady Plan, existing loan obligations were securitized and
converted into bonds. As a result, sovereign creditors became far more
numerous and atomized.
A secondary market for sovereign debt
instruments thus emerged. However, atomization also created new
complexities and exacerbated collective action problems, all of which
further complicated orderly debt restructuring.38 While commercial banks
proved willing participants in voluntary debt restructuring efforts, atomized
bondholders with divergent interests have proven more difficult. Recent
years have seen increasing creditor litigation against sovereigns while the
identity of plaintiffs has shifted from large banks to distressed debt hedge
funds, which account for 90% of such lawsuits since 2000.39 Also on the
rise is the percentage of sovereign defaults that trigger lawsuits, which has
doubled in recent years.40
Unenforceability has shown some signs of erosion beginning in the
1970s. First, the scope of sovereign immunity was trimmed with the U.S.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976 and the U.K. State
Immunities Act of 1978.41 Next, a series of judicial decisions disposed of
36
Under the Brady Plan, named after U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, bank loans to
sovereigns were converted into dollar-denominated sovereign bonds. See Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph
Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on Inter-Creditor Relationships, 1988
U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 500 (1988).
37
Id.
38
Bratton & Gulati, supra note 34, at 20–22.
39
Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 3.
40
Id. at 2 (“The likelihood that a debt crisis is accompanied by creditor litigation has more than
doubled over the past decade, to more than 40% in recent years.”). For details on the complexity of the
Argentine default, see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
41
The FSIA codified several exceptions to sovereign immunity, including commercial activities.
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key state defenses—including act of state,42 international comity,43 and
champerty44—opening new doors for litigious holdout creditors. Finally, as
explained further below, the pari passu era gained momentum in the 1990s
with groundbreaking litigation in New York and Belgium.45
The demise of the comity defense and act of the state defense came in
1985 with Allied v. Costa Rica.46 Meanwhile, sovereign borrowing came to
be considered a “commercial activity” in 1992—thus lacking immunity
under the FSIA—with the Supreme Court decision in Republic of Argentina
v. Weltover.47 The champerty defense was weakened in 1995 by CIBC v.
Brazil48 before legislation effectively eliminated it under New York law.49
Gradually, as classic defenses and immunity from lawsuits eroded,
attachment of assets became the main obstacle to collecting against
sovereigns.50 For this reason, asset hunting is increasingly crucial in
modern sovereign debt disputes.51

See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (1976) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Two years later, the United Kingdom passed similar legislation. See
State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, §§ 1–23 (Eng.).
42
See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
43
See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
44
See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
45
See Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacila, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999); Elliott Assocs., L.P.
v. Banco de la Nacila, 194 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 961 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Elliott Assocs. L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See generally
William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823
(2004); Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott Case: A Brilliant
Strategy but an Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39 (2011) (discussing the
Elliott Assocs. decisions).
46
See Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Crédito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff’d, No. 83-7714, slip op. (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1984) (per curiam), rev’d, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
For an in-depth discussion of the comity defense in sovereign debt litigation, see Stephen Bainbridge,
Comity and Sovereign Debt Litigation: A Bankruptcy Analogy, 10 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1 (1986).
47
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614–16 (1992) (concluding that issuing
bonds is a "commercial activity" similar in nature to a private party’s issuance of commercial bonds).
For further discussion of the scope of the commercial activity exception under FSIA, see William R.
Dorsey, III, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 257, 263–66 (1997).
48
See CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Cent. do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105, 1110–11
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
49
Champerty is a common law doctrine that precludes recovery when debt is purchased with the
sole intent and purpose to litigate on it. Passed in 2004, Judiciary Law 489 eliminated champerty for
debts worth more than $500,000. For a discussion of the decline of the champerty defense in sovereign
debt litigation, see Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 34, at 52.
50
See Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 25, at 1220; see also Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at
8 (describing the current environment for sovereign debt litigation as a “hunt for assets”).
51
See infra Part II.B.
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More recently, holdout creditors have succeeded in suing states for
breaches of the pari passu clause.52 A landmark case for the current era of
pari passu litigation is Elliott v. Peru, in which Elliott Associates, L.P.
(Elliott Associates) convinced a Belgian appeals court to enforce a
sovereign debt judgment with injunctive remedies applicable to third-party
financial entities.53 In doing so, the Belgian court embraced a ratable
payment interpretation of pari passu advocated in a declaration by
Professor Andreas Lowenfeld.54 This approach to pari passu requires a
sovereign to pay holdouts and exchange bondholders alike. Relying on the
ratable interpretation, the court crafted injunctions prohibiting financial
institutions from processing payments from Peru to exchange bondholders.
In doing so, the Belgian court denied Peru’s ability to prioritize payments
among creditors—an established privilege of sovereign borrowers for the
better part of a century.55 In effect, this approach forced Peru to decide
between defaulting on the exchanged bonds and paying the holdouts.
Facing these scenarios, Peru opted to settle with Elliott Associates for $58.4
million, a 400% gain on the purchase value of the defaulted bonds for the
hedge fund.56
Importantly, the ratable approach in pari passu litigation allows
holdouts to interfere with a sovereign’s cross-border payments to other
creditors—namely exchange bondholders who participated in debt
restructuring—rather than engaging in the difficult game of attaching the
sovereign’s assets. Finding a court willing to adopt this radical approach
may be challenging, but the ratable interpretation of pari passu combined
with injunctive relief alleviates the classic attachment problem for
collecting against sovereigns. But this approach also has high collateral
costs, often at the expense of innocent third parties like exchange creditors
and financial institutions.57 Importantly, this approach weakens creditor
52
For detailed chronology and critiques of the pari passu trend in sovereign debt litigation, see Buchheit &
Pam, supra note 25, at 877–91. See also Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 25, at 1228–34.
53
The remedies involved restraining orders against financial parties involved in payment processing
from Peru to exchange bondholders Chase Manhattan Bank, Euroclear System, and Depository Trust
Company. See Cours d’Appel [CA] [Courts of Appeal] Brussels, 8e ch. Sept. 26, 2000, General Docket
No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.). See generally Bratton, supra note 45; Olivares-Caminal, supra note 45.
54
The ratable payment interpretation of pari passu extends equal footing obligations to actual
payments, as opposed to rank, and provides grounds for the injunctive relief seen in Elliott and NML.
For an extensive review of Elliott and the Lowenfeld Declaration, see Buchheit & Pam, supra note 25,
at 877–80 (citing Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld Dated August 31, 2000, at 11–12).
55
See BORCHARD, supra note 32; see also Buchheit & Pam, supra note 25, at 898 n.64; Bratton,
supra note 45, at 844–46 (explaining priority of payment as an established choice for sovereigns).
56
See Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 28, at 1225 n.60 (citing John Nolan, Special Policy
Report 3: Emerging Market Debt & Vulture Hedge Funds: Free-Ridership, Legal & Market Remedies,
FIN. POLICY FORUM: DERIVATIVES STUDY CTR. (Sept. 29, 2001), http://www.financialpolicy.org/
DSCNolan.htm; Gulati & Klee, supra note 28).
57
See Joint Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees NML Capital, Ltd. et al. at 39, NML Capital,
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incentives to participate in sovereign restructurings. Accordingly, the
Elliott decision had its share of critics, many of them prominent voices in
sovereign debt.58
B. Needles in Haystacks: The Hunt for Sovereign Assets
Most of the legal innovation in sovereign debt litigation stems from
cases brought by distressed debt hedge funds, also known as “vulture”
funds.59 These funds specialize in acquiring distressed sovereign debt at
deep discounts before attempting to recover a profit through more favorable
swaps or litigation.60 Like the role of the vulture in a real ecosystem,
vulture funds play a somewhat underappreciated role in financial markets,
providing scarce liquidity to bondholders seeking an exit in distressed
times.61 Fairness and ethics aside, vulturing is also a legal activity. In fact,
the business of vulturing is fundamentally legal in nature—dependent
almost entirely on the judicial enforcement of contractual rights.62
But these hedge funds have their share of critics, ranging from United
Nations officials and IMF economists to religious charities.63 Many dismiss
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-0105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2013); Brief for Non-Party
Appellants Exchange Bondholder Group at 2, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-0105cv(L) (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (arguing against NML injunctions that would infringe on property rights of
exchange bondholders); see also Brief of the American Bankers Ass’n, supra note 20; Brief for Amicus
Curiae the Clearing House Ass’n, supra note 20.
58
See FMLC STUDY, supra note 28, at 11; see also Buchheit & Pam, supra note 25, at 883–92;
W.M.C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 123, 125 (2013);
Gulati & Klee, supra note 28, at 650; G. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3 1/2 MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 45−52 , (Univ. of Chicago Press
2012); See generally Olivares-Caminal, Quest, supra note 25; Brief of the American Bankers Ass’n,
supra note 20; Brief for Amicus Curiae the Clearing House Ass’n, supra note 20.
59
See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1049–51 (2004); see also Schumacher et al., supra
note 8, at 7–9.
60
See Robin Wigglesworth, Vulture Funds Come Under Sovereign Fire, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013, 10:09
AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41a633ae-ab3d-11e2-8c63-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2r QrOZWe2.
61
Journalist Felix Salmon presents both sides of the vulture argument. Compare Felix Salmon,
Vulture Funds in Distress, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felixsalmon/2011/02/23/vulture-funds-in-distress/, with Felix Salmon, In Defense of Vulture Funds (Feb. 24,
2011), http://www.felixsalmon.com/2007/02/in-defense-of-vulture-funds/.
62
See Sam Jones, Singer Banks on the Full Force of Law, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2012, 6:00 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aaf5e32c-0ee9-11e2-ba6b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2r QrOZWe2.
63
See Jonathan Lynn, U.N. Debt Expert to Focus on Vulture Funds, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/21/idUSLDE60K1S8; see also Ashley Seager, MPs Act to Keep
the Vultures at Bay, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/
may/06/vulture-funds. Jubilee USA Network has been a particularly vocal critic of the vulture fund
industry. See JUBILEE USA NETWORK, VULTURE FUNDS AND POOR COUNTRY DEBT: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY RESPONSES (2008), available at http://www.jubileeusa.org/fileadmin
/user_upload/Resources/Policy _Archive/408briefnotevulturefunds.pdf.
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the industry as an unethical practice that further burdens the poor and
undermines debt relief for HIPCs.64 Indeed, vulture funds are particularly
likely to be plaintiffs in legal actions against HIPCs.65 On average, targets
of vulture litigation tend to be middle income and poor countries that have
recently undergone serious economic distress.66 Critics also maintain that
vulture funds benefit a small number of elites at the expense of taxpayers in
developing countries.67
Adding to popular intrigue, the vulture industry is also famously
opaque and often staged from offshore tax havens through various limited
liability investment vehicles.68 These tendencies reinforce the perception
that these funds prey on taxpayers in developing countries to benefit
wealthy tycoons. Two of the most famous and successful vulture funds
include Dart Management (founded by Kenneth Dart) and Elliott
Management (founded by Paul Elliott Singer).69 Dart and Singer are
prominent faces in the distressed debt industry; both are plaintiffs in NML
through affiliated entities.70
Returns in the distressed debt business can be extremely lucrative.71
But the business model does not suit just anyone; it requires an appetite for
risk and ample cash for expensive legal battles against sovereigns.72
Though funds may buy sovereign debt for a fraction of face value, the deep
discounts usually reflect the likelihood of creditor losses and the significant
costs and risks associated with collection. Indeed, full repayment is not the
64

See Lynn, infra note 66.
See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 3 (“‘Vulture’ funds are also particularly likely to initiate
legal disputes against Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Of the 20 cases filed against HIPC, 13
were filed by ‘vultures.’”).
66
See id. at 12.
67
See, e.g., Greg Palast et al., UK Urged to Prevent Vulture Funds Preying on the World’s Poorest
Countries, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2011, 6:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
2011/nov/15/call-action-vulture-funds-poor.
68
Id. See also Eliana Raszewski, Billionaire Dart’s Argentine Unit Raided by Tax Agents,
BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-21/billionaire-dart-sargentine-foam-cup-unit-raided-by-tax-agents.html (“Dart gave up his U.S. citizenship in the 1990s to
avoid taxes and moved to the Cayman Islands.”).
69
Landon Thomas Jr., Rejecting Greek Debt Deal Results In a Hefty Payoff for the Holdouts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 2012, § B (Late Edition, Business/Financial Desk), at 3 (stating that the Dart fund’s
founder is Kenneth Dart, heir to a billion-dollar Styrofoam cup business and a U.S. tax exile who lives
in the Cayman Islands); see also Jones, supra note 62 (profiling Paul Elliott Singer and the success of
Elliott Management).
70
Drew Benson, Bond Vigilantes’ Ghana Ambush Proves Default Hex Unbroken, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct 4, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-04/bond-vigilantes-ghanatrap-shows-default-hex-argentina-credit.
71
A Victory by Default?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2005), http://www.economist.com/ node/3715779
(“According to Manmohan Singh, an economist at the [IMF], the annualized returns from successful
litigation can be more than 300%”).
72
See Wigglesworth, supra note 60.
65
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norm. If litigation or collection efforts fail, a distressed debt investor may
end up taking a total loss.
Collecting sovereign assets is notoriously difficult.73 Although most
attachment efforts prove fruitless, they often make headlines—as with the
attempted seizures of Argentine assets around the world.74 In October
2012, Elliott Associates persuaded Ghanaian authorities to seize the
Libertad, a classic three-masted sailing frigate used for naval training and
goodwill missions.75 After some dramatic moments and a drawn-out legal
battle, the U.N. Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ordered that the Libertad be
released.76 Meanwhile, Argentina’s presidential plane, the Tango 01,
remained conspicuously grounded following the debacle in Ghana.77 Other
asset skirmishes involved efforts to attach $105 million in reserves held by
the Central Bank of Argentina.78 On another occasion, the office of a
representative of the province of Buenos Aires in New York was targeted.
Even dinosaur fossils on exhibition in Europe were targets for attachment.79
Though none of these attempts successfully yielded valuable assets, they
were all costly and embarrassing for Argentina. The financial impact of
asset battles can easily run into the millions.80 More difficult to quantify
but also painful, these skirmishes also involve reputational damage and
interference with international commerce and other cross-border

73

See Gelpern, Contract Hope, supra note 31; see also Bratton, supra note 45, at 824 (“Sovereigns
in default rarely leave valuables lying around subject to attachment in creditor-friendly jurisdictions.”).
74
See Benson, supra note 70; see also Gauchos and Gadflies, ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/21533453.
75
See Chris Barrett, Frigate Libertad: Vulture Funds and Cabin Fever in West Africa, ARGENTINA
INDEP. (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/ frigate-libertad-vulturefunds-and-cabin-fever-in-west-africa/.
76
See Ghana Told to Free Argentine Ship Libertad by UN Court, BBC (Dec. 15, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20743016.
77
See Linette Lopez, Hedge Funder Paul Singer Went Ballistic on Argentina In His Q4 Investor
Letter, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ elliott-management-q4investor-letter-2013-1.
78
See U.S. Supreme Court Rules in Favour of Argentina and Unfreezes Funds, MERCOPRESS (June 26,
2012, 6:25 AM), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/06/26/us-supreme-court-rules-in-favour-of-argentina-andunfreezes-funds (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court denied the request for attachment of the Central Bank
of Argentina reserves in October 2007).
79
See Michael Hiltzik, Argentina is Cautionary Tale as U.S. Debates Debt Limit, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/15/business/la-fi-hiltzik-201 30116.
80
A prominent Argentine newspaper, La Nación, estimated that the seizure of the Libertad in Ghana
cost the Argentine government around $5 million. See Mariano De Vedia, Enviar Marinos Para Traer
la Fragata Costó $5 Millones, LA NACIÓN (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1540147enviar-marinos-para-traer-la-fragata-costo-5-millones. The incident cost Ghana several million as well.
See ARA Libertad: Ghana Port Authority Lost 7.6m Dollars; Could Demand NML Capital,
MERCOPRESS (Dec. 20, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/12/20/ara-libertad-ghana-portauthority-lost-7.6m-dollars-could-demand-nml-capital.
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activities.81 Partially or wholly state-owned enterprises may also be
targeted in the hunt for assets.82
C. Sovereign Debt and Restructuring
For decades, scholars and multilateral institutions alike have explored
possibilities for quasi-bankruptcy or debt restructuring regimes for
sovereigns.83 Yet, no such system exists. In the absence of a formal
insolvency regime, sovereign debt defaults typically lead to voluntary
negotiated restructurings and reissuances of new debt.84 Existing debt
obligations are exchanged for new debt obligations through negotiated
restructuring. Though imperfect, restructuring practices have balanced the
interests of creditors and sovereign debtors for generations.85 In most cases,
the vast majority of creditors participate in the debt exchanges because the
burden of a financial crisis is shared between the debtor and its creditors.86
“Holdout” creditors are those who decide not to participate in a debt
exchange whereas “exchange” creditors do. Institutional lenders, such as
large banks, prefer participation and collaborative restructuring to holding
out. Though hedge funds are usually the most visible and significant
holdouts, sometimes retail investors or pensioners holdout as well.
In exchange for granting debt relief to allow a distressed sovereign the
chance to restore fiscal stability, creditors agree to take a loss—the socalled “haircut”—and receive newly issued debt.87 Surprisingly, given the

81

See Panizza et al., supra note 27, at 659–64.
See Pablo Gonzalez, YPF Slumps as NML’s Singer Seeks Argentine Asset Information,
BLOOMBERG (Jun. 19, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-19/ypf-slumps-as-nml-s-singer
-seeks-argentine-asset-information.html.
83
For examples of early sovereign insolvency proposals, see generally UNCTAD, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1986). See also Bratton, supra note 45; Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for
Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1095 (2013) [hereinafter Gelpern, Bankruptcy]; Anna Gelpern,
Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888 (2012) [hereinafter
Gelpern, Quasi-Sovereign]; Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt,
36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299 (2005); IMF, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING, infra note 227; Kenneth
Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001,
49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002) .
84
See Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 34, at 48 (describing the voluntary nature of sovereign debt
restructuring and contrasting the practice with the bankruptcy process); see also Anna Gelpern, Building
a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1115 (2004) [hereinafter Gelpern,
Building].
85
See Weidemaier, supra note 58, at 127.
86
Between 1997 and 2013, the average participation rate in sovereign debt defaults was 95%.
During that period, only Argentina and Dominica had participation rates under 90%. See ELENA
DUGGAR, MOODY’S, NEW EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF HOLDOUT CREDITORS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURINGS 9 (2013).
87
See Bratton, supra note 45, at 828.
82
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unenforceability of sovereign debt and voluntary nature of sovereign
restructuring, creditor haircuts in sovereign debt restructurings (30%,
weighted for volume) tend to be significantly lower than haircuts in
corporate bond and loan restructurings in United States (64%).88 But
without an insolvency regime, sovereigns do not enjoy benefits of debtorfriendly provisions found, for example, in U.S. bankruptcy law. Detroit, for
instance, has relied upon the threat of “cram downs” and bankruptcy
protections to convince creditors and pensioners to take haircuts.89
Theoretical models predict that when haircuts are deemed excessive relative
to the sovereign’s ability to pay, an exchange offer is more likely to fail.90
Likewise, deep haircuts are more likely to spawn litigation.91
Although sovereign creditors lack leverage enjoyed by creditors in
other areas of the law, sovereign borrowers and their creditors have
resolved disputes through restructuring for generations.92 Despite limited
enforcement mechanisms, sovereigns have compelling reasons to pay debts.
Traditionally, sovereign motivation was explained by diplomacy, access to
markets, sanctions, and reputational factors.93 More recent accounts have
addressed domestic costs of default as an explanation for sovereign
motivation, including the political consequences of debt default.94
III. NML: SOVEREIGN DEBT OUTLIER
The Second Circuit recognized Argentina’s situation as an
“exceptional” on unlikely to be seen again in the future.95 The Second
Circuit arrived at this conclusion in light of Argentina’s track record as a
“recalcitrant” debtor with “a long history of defaulting on its debts,” while
describing Argentina’s behavior as “extraordinary.”96 Although the Second
88
See Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts 10–11
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 3604, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1943411 (citing MOODY’S, DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES OF CORPORATE BOND ISSUERS, 1920–
2005 (2006)).
89
See Marcelo Etchebarne, Guest post: Argentina and Detroit – Different (Zip) Codes, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/03/04/guest-post-argentina-and-detroit-differentzip-codes/# (underscoring creditor-friendly bankruptcy provisions that are unavailable to sovereigns).
90
See Ran Bi et al., The Problem That Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt
Restructurings (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/11/265, 2011).
91
See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 22.
92
See Weidemaier, supra note 58, at 127.
93
See Panizza et al., supra note 27, at 659–64 (reviewing literature exploring questions of why
sovereigns pay their creditors); see also BORCHARD, supra note 32, at 122.
94
See Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default, 56 IMF STAFF PAPERS
683, 688–90 (2009).
95
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, appeal docketed, No. 12-105(L) at 23
(2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013).
96
Id.
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Circuit correctly identified this aspect of the NML situation as
extraordinary, Argentina’s exceptionalism extends to virtually all phases of
sovereign debt: lending, default, restructuring, and litigation. Ultimately,
NML is readily distinguishable from other sovereign debt situations.97
This part illustrates that NML’s facts make it an outlier by wide
margins. First, this part explains Argentina’s exceptional sovereign debt
history. Second, Argentina’s default was the largest and most complex in
world history.98 Third, the circumstances leading up to the 2001 crisis were
also exceptional, casting doubt about the legitimacy of Argentina’s foreign
debt—particularly within Argentina’s political system—from the outset of
the default.99 Fourth, Argentina’s “uniquely unilateral and coercive”
approach to restructuring was unparalleled, setting the stage for a similarly
unprecedented flood of sovereign debt litigation.100 Finally, during the
litigation stage, the Argentine situation has again defied historic trends in
sovereign debt.101
A. Argentina’s Unique Sovereign Debt History
The Argentine government has been labeled—fairly or unfairly—as a
“rogue debtor” and a “serial defaulter.”102 Putting it slightly more
delicately, the Second Circuit opted for the label of “recalcitrant debtor.”103
As explained in this part, these labels are nothing new for Argentina.
Almost a decade prior to the 2001 default, one writer observed, “Argentina
emerged as the single most resistant debtor in international finance.”104
Studies have concluded that there may be a self-perpetuating aspect to
serial defaults: the less reputational capital a debtor has to lose, the more
attractive the default option might become.105
Though several countries have defaulted more often, Argentina is
often portrayed as an exceptionally rogue debtor.106 Argentina has nearly a
97

See id.
See A Victory by Default?, supra note 71.
99
See infra note 147–150 and accompanying text.
100
ELENA DUGGAR, MOODY’S, THE ROLE OF HOLDOUT CREDITORS AND CACS IN SOVEREIGN
DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 2 (2013).
101
See infra Part III.E.
102
See Porzecanski, supra note 29, at 316–17.
103
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. 2013).
104
ERNEST J. OLIVERI, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
164 (1992).
105
See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart et al., Debt Intolerance 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9908, 2003).
106
See Argentina’s Debt Saga: No Movement, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21610296-argentina-has-defaulted-again-deal-its-creditors-notout-question-no?fsrc=scn%2Ftw_ec%2Fno_movement.
98

64

_JD_Samples Final Read_1.24.15.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

3/12/15 7:53 AM

Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt
35:49 (2014)

two centuries long history of difficulties with creditors.107 This history is
extensive and painful, a “long-festering wound” in Argentina’s side.108 A
museum at the School of Economic Sciences at the University of Buenos
Aires has a dedicated exhibit that tells the story from an Argentine
perspective.109 At one point in the 1840s, Argentine caudillo Juan Manuel
de Rosas offered to pay bondholders with las Malvinas, which are
commonly known as the Falkland Islands in English.110 Even the genesis of
the Paris Club involved an Argentine debt crisis.111
Argentina led Latin America—and the developing world, for that
matter—in scholarship on sovereign debt from the perspective of former
colonies. Historically, Argentine scholars and diplomats have been at the
forefront of theory on the law of sovereign debt, especially concerning
rights of newly independent sovereigns.112 In 1863, Argentine jurist Carlos
Calvo published the foundations of the highly influential Calvo Doctrine.113
As Venezuela was facing a “gunboat diplomacy” style intervention by
European powers in 1902, Luis M. Drago, Argentina’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs, wrote a letter that established the Drago Doctrine.114 Both
doctrines advocate for host government sovereign rights in investment
disputes, which were especially important to newly independent nations
emerging from colonialism.115
107
See Boris Korby & Karia Porzecanski, Argentina Bust Lures Investors After 200 Years of
Defaults, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-03/
argentina-bust-lures-bass-led-investors-in-200-years-of-defaults.html (characterizing Argentina as a
“deadbeat country with few peers in history”).
108
Jude Webber, Debt – Argentina’s Long-Festering Wound, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012, 3:31 AM),
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1521e81c-3894-11e2-bd7d-00144feabdc0.html.
109
MUSEO DE LA DEUDA EXTERNA, http://www.museodeladeuda.com.ar/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2014).
110
See Emilio Ocampo, El Día que Rosas Quiso Pagar a los Bonistas con las Malvinas, LA NACIÓN
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1544122-el-dia-que-rosas-quiso-pagar-a-los-bonistas-conlas-malvinas.
111
According to the official website of the Paris Club: “The Paris Club is an informal group of
official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties
experienced by debtor countries.” The Paris Club has nineteen permanent member countries. The IMF
and the World Bank participate in debt negotiations as observers.
See CLUB DE PARIS,
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
112
See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007).
113
The Calvo Doctrine condemned armed and diplomatic interventions for investment disputes. See
Amos Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 26, 26–27 (1907).
114
Id. at 30 (“[T]he public debt [of an American state] can not occasion armed intervention, nor
even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power.” (quoting Letter
from Luis M. Drago, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Sr. Merou, Argentine Minister at
Washington (Dec. 29, 1902))).
115
See Hershey, supra note 113; see also Amitav Acharya, Ideas, Norms and Regional Orders, in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION 183 (T.V. Paul ed.,
Cambridge University Press 2012) available at http://www.amitavacharya.com/sites/default/files/
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B. Argentina’s Crisis of 2001–2002: “The Worst of All”
During 2001–2002, Argentina suffered an economic crisis of epic
proportions following a broader wave of emerging market crises that swept
through East Asia and Russia.116 The collapse was comprehensive and
tragically spectacular—one of the worst currency crises of the modern era.
Argentina’s crisis involved the deepest drop in gross domestic product
(GDP) suffered during peaceful times by any capitalist country with a
significant economy since at least World War II.117 Real per capita GDP
fell backwards by three decades.118 The Argentine peso declined 75%
versus the U.S. dollar in a matter of months.119 Meanwhile, Argentina’s
public debt ballooned from 45.7% of GDP in 2000 to 166.3% in 2002.120
Argentina formally defaulted on bonds worth $81.2 billion in
December of 2001.121 The dimensions of this default were staggering. As
illustrated in Figure 1 below, Argentina’s default remains by far the largest
sovereign debt default in history, dwarfing prior defaults by Russia ($30
billion), Ecuador ($6 billion), and Uruguay ($5 billion).122 The Argentine
default was also the most complex ever seen. Over half a million creditors
scattered around the world held 152 varieties of defaulted debt instruments,
which were denominated in six currencies under the laws of eight different
jurisdictions.123

Ideas%20norms%20and%20regional%20orders.pdf (discussing the role played by the Calvo and Drago
doctrines in the adoption of the principle of non-intervention in Latin America).
116
Due in large part to a steep climb in interest rates, debt rollover costs spiked in the wake of the
crises in East Asia and Russia. The rising cost of financing exacerbated Argentina’s already
unsustainable debt load. See Mario Damill et al., Las Cuentas Públicas y la Crisis de la Convertibilidad
en la Argentina, 43 DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO 203 (2003).
117
Lucas Llach, A Depression in Perspective: The Economic and the Political Economy of
Argentina’s Crisis of the Millenium, in THE ARGENTINE CRISIS AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENIUM 40
(Flavia Fiourcci & Marcus Klein eds., 2004).
118
See J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32637, ARGENTINA’S SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING 5 (2004).
119
See PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT) 2 (2006).
120
See HORNBECK, supra note 13, at 3.
121
See A Victory by Default?, supra note 71, at 1.
122
See ELENA DUGGAR, MOODY’S, SOVEREIGN DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES, 1983-2007 7–8
(2008), available at https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/DefaultResearch/2007100000482445.pdf.
Greece’s debt exchange in 2012 became the largest sovereign restructuring in history but did not involve
a technical default. See Landon Thomas Jr., Next Time, Greece May Need New Tactics, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/03/10/business/global/greece-debt-restructuring-dealprivate-lenders.html?pagewanted =all&_r=0.
123
See A Victory by Default?, supra note 71, at 1.
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Figure 1: Largest Sovereign Debt Defaults
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As the economy crashed, so did the nation’s government and banking
systems.124 Political upheaval ensued as looting, protests, and even rioting
took hold of urban centers.125 At one point, Argentina technically had five
presidents in the course of two weeks.126 For Argentines, who are rather
accustomed to enduring crises, this was la peor de todas, the worst of all.127
Social costs were tragic. Argentina, a country with a history of relative
prosperity and an established middle class, saw over half of its population
fall below the poverty line.128 Post crisis, approximately 25% of Argentina
lived in extreme poverty compared to just 4% in 1992.129 Unemployment
exceeded 20%.130 Malnutrition became a serious problem in a country
renowned for fine beef and abundant grains.131 Living standards dropped
124

See Clifford Krauss, Reeling from Riots, Argentina Declares a State of Siege, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/20/world/reeling-from-riots-argentina-declares-a-state-ofsiege.html.
125
Id.; see also BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 184–87, 190–96 (explaining the political, social, and
economic chaos that arrived with the 2001 crisis).
126
See New Man Takes Helm in Argentina, BBC AMERICAS (Jan. 2, 2002, 7:12 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1737562.stm.
127
See Jorge Oviedo, Crisis, la Peor de Todas, LA NACIÓN (July 14, 2002),
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/413669-crisis-la-peor-de-todas.
128
See LEONARDO GASPARINI, CEDLAS-THE WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN
ARGENTINA: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND A LITERATURE REVIEW 35 (2004), available at
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/monitoreo/pdfs/review_argentina.pdf.
129
Id.
130
See SHINJI TAKAGI, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE, IMF, THE IMF AND ARGENTINA 19912001 8 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2004/ arg/eng/pdf/report.pdf.
131
See Larry Rohter, Once Secure, Argentines Now Lack Food and Hope, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/02/world/once-secure-argentines-now-lack-food-and-hope.html?page
wanted=all&src=pm; see also Hannah Baldock, Child Hunger Deaths Shock Argentina, GUARDIAN (Nov.
24, 2002), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2002/nov/25/famine.argentina.
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dramatically and Argentines watched their wealth evaporate in the wake of
deep currency devaluations and capital flight.
C. Exceptional Circumstances: The Other Crisis (of Legitimacy)
The history behind NML raises poignant legitimacy questions and
helps explain the politics of Argentina’s behavior towards creditors. Just
years before the largest sovereign default in world history, Argentina had
been the emerging market darling of the international financial
community.132 Under President Carlos Saúl Menem in the 1990s,
Argentina adhered to the “Washington Consensus,” removing trade
barriers, deregulating the economy, welcoming foreign investment, and
privatizing key industries.133 During this time, Argentina was continuously
engaged with the IMF through policy advice and five successive financing
arrangements.134 Argentina was widely considered a “star pupil” of the
IMF.135 In 1998, President Menem was invited to address the IMF at its
annual meeting to discuss the “absolute economic miracle” Argentina had
undergone during his administration.136
On one hand, there is little doubt that Argentina was the victim of selfinflicted damage. The government overborrowed while failing to practice
the fiscal discipline required by a strict currency regime and its own
economic policies.137 Ultimately, responsibility for the failed policies of
the 1990s belongs to the Argentine government.138 On the other hand,
Argentina was not alone in setting the stage for the largest sovereign debt
default in history.139 Wall Street, the IMF, and even the broader
132
See Todd Jatras, Cavallo To Argentina’s Rescue, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2001, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2001/03/22/0322argentina.html (characterizing Argentina’s economy minister,
Domingo Cavallo, as a “Wall Street darling”); see also Ken Parks, Taos Turner & John Lyons,
Argentina Reels: A Populist Formula Goes Flat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2014, at A1 (describing
Argentina’s “long decline from a darling of global capitalism to economic pariah”).
133
See BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 4.
134
See TAKAGI, supra note 130, at 9, 77.
135
See Hector Tobar, The Good Life Is No More for Argentina, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2003),
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/18/world/fg-argecon18.
136
CARLOS SARL MENEM, PRESIDENT, REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, STATEMENT TO THE 1998 JOINT
ANNUAL MEETINGS (Oct. 6, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/am/1998/speeches/
pr05e.pdf.
137
Enacted under the Menem Administration in 1991 and intended to curb the kind of hyperinflation
spikes that toppled the Alfonsín Administration, Argentina’s “convertibility” plan pegged the Argentine
peso to the U.S. dollar. However, coupled with unsustainable debt and public spending, the rigid plan
eventually set the stage for the 2001 default. See TAKAGI, supra note 130, at 3 (2004).
138
See BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 199 (critiquing the “popular myth” that the IMF was dictating
Argentina’s economic policy throughout the 1990s.).
139
See Todd Benson, Report Looks Harshly at I.M.F.’s Role in Argentine Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(July 30, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/30/business/report-looks-harshly-at-imf-s-role-in-
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international finance community compounded Argentina’s crisis
significantly.140
After the crisis, the IMF published a self-critical evaluation of its role
in Argentina’s crisis.141 An independent report by the Independent
Evaluation Office of the IMF was even more critical of the IMF’s role in
Argentina’s debt situation.142 As noted by the Economist in 2005,
“Argentina defaulted so heavily because it defaulted so late.”143 If
anything, Argentina may have been too reluctant to default on its
obligations, racking up billions more in debt when default was already an
inevitable conclusion.144 Two loans extended in 2001, for instance, only
exacerbated the existing debt burden.145
The causal inquiry into Argentina’s crash is a well-documented and
vigorously debated topic.146 Analyzing the economic meltdown is beyond
the scope of this Article, but the backlash within Argentina against the IMF
and the international financial community is particularly relevant here.
Combined with rising poverty and high unemployment, this perception of
great injustice—however accurate—brought the legitimacy of Argentina’s
international obligations and external debt into doubt from the outset of the
crash.147 As part of the exceptional nature of Argentina’s sovereign debt
situation, this reaction shaped the behavior of Argentina’s leaders during
the restructuring process and continues to influence policy towards holdout
creditors.148 Vulture funds are widely despised in Argentina; settling with
argentine-debt-crisis.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm.
140
Id.; see also Argentina: Writing of the Wreckage, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2005),
http://www.economist.com/node/3714880 (“Wall Street investment banks raked in fees for issuing yet
more Argentine bonds even as some of their analysts were privately gloomy about the country.”); see
also BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 199–200.
141
See POLICY DEV. & REVIEW DEP’T, IMF, LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA 63–67
(2003), available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/lessons/100803.pdf.
142
See TAKAGI, supra note 130.
143
A Victory by Default?, supra note 71.
144
Id.
145
See Argentina: Writing of the Wreckage, supra note 140.
146
For a thorough review of the literature, see IMF, LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA,
supra note 141, at 5.
147
The IMF’s contributing role in exacerbating Argentina’s debt load impacted the perceived
legitimacy of foreign debt. See BLUSTEIN, supra note 119; see also Cephas Lumina, United Nations
Independent Expert, End of Mission Statement (Nov. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14040&LangID=E (noting
questions about legitimacy of debt acquired prior to the 2001 default); Larry Rohter, Argentine Leader
Slashes Debt and Tightens Grip, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/01/03/world/ americas/03iht-buenos.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
148
See Argentina’s Kirchner Boosts Approval on IMF Clashes (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6,
2004), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afHs6w HOB6JI; see also
BLUSTEIN, supra note 119, at 206–07; Patrice M. Jones, President Buoys Argentina, CHI. TRIB. (Nov.
27, 2003), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/ 2003-11-27/news/0311270371_1_president-nestor-
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them is a politically charged issue with practical and moral implications.149
Argentina entered into default following the NML ruling instead of settling
with the holdouts, although this decision may have had more to do with
potential liabilities stemming from the so-called RUFO clause than with
distaste for the vultures.150
D. An Unparalleled Debt Restructuring
Restructuring negotiations following Argentina’s default were easily
among the most adversarial restructuring negotiations ever. The Argentine
restructuring defied established guidelines of sovereign debt negotiation
and was widely considered “unique in its unilateral and coercive approach
to the debt restructuring.”151 President Néstor Kirchner took a hard line,
insisting that creditors take a sizeable haircut in line with Argentina’s
devastating losses.152 The IMF, usually a key participant in sovereign debt
restructuring negotiations, was much less involved due to controversy
surrounding the Fund’s role leading up to Argentina’s economic crisis.
In January 2005, after years of bitter negotiations, Argentina opened a
bond exchange (the 2005 Exchange) hoping to reach a final settlement on
as many of the defaulted bonds as possible—roughly $104.1 billion in
principal ($81.2 billion) and past due interest ($22.9 billion).153 At that
time, the $104.1 billion in defaulted bonds only represented about 53% of
Argentina’s total of $194.6 billion in unsustainable public debt.154 As a
consequence, bondholders shouldered a disproportionate burden in
Argentina’s attempt to achieve a sustainable level of debt through
restructuring.155
Like the crisis and the default, the 2005 Exchange was exceptional
across the board: the amount in default ($104.1 billion), the lengthy
duration of the restructuring process (over three years), the deep creditor
haircut (roughly 76%), and the low participation rate (only 72% of
bondholders).156 In an average restructuring, negotiations last seven months
and participation exceeds 95%. Representing par value of $62.3 billion,
kirchner-president-carlos-menem-amnesty-laws.
149
See John Paul Rathbone et al., Argentina in default as contest with holdouts enters endgame, FIN.
TIMES (June 29, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/15c4c27e-fded-11e3-acf8-00144f
eab7de.html.
150
Argentina’s Endless Debt Dilemma, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 31, 2014, 6:39 PM), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/561bb58c-18a8-11e4-a51a-00144feabdc0.html.
151
DUGGAR, supra note 100.
152
See HORNBECK, supra note 121, at 6–11.
153
Id. at 3.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See DUGGAR, supra note 100.
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creditors received roughly 35 cents on the dollar in the 2005 Exchange.157
Comparisons with average indicators in other sovereign debt exchanges
indicate the truly exceptional nature of Argentina’s restructuring, as
illustrated in Figures 2–4 below.

Figure 2:
Participation (%)

Figure 3:
Duration (months)
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Source for Figures 2–3: Moody’s Investors Service (2013)

Figure 4: Creditor Haircut (%)
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Source for Figure 4: Cruces and Trebesch (2011)

At 72%, the participation rate of the 2005 Exchange fell far below the
mean (Figure 2).158 Between 1997 and 2013, the average participation rate
in sovereign debt exchanges was 95%.159 All but two restructurings—
Argentina and Dominica—had participation rates over 90%.160 Through
subsequent negotiations, Argentina achieved almost 93% participation and
157
158
159
160

A Victory By Default?, supra note 71.
See DUGGAR, supra note 100.
Id.
Id.
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Dominica achieved almost 100%.161 But in Argentina’s case, achieving
even this modest level of participation took the better part of a decade.
According to one model, deeper haircuts decrease creditor
participation and increase the likelihood of holdouts and litigation.162 As
illustrated in Figure 4 above, in a sample of 180 restructurings from 1970 to
2010, the haircut imposed on Argentina’s creditors (roughly 77% in the
2005 Exchange) comes in far above average.163 The average haircut during
that period was 37% or just 30% in a volume weighted average.164 Again,
Argentina’s sovereign debt situation is a quantitative outlier that defies
modern restructuring trends.165 Even the tone of the negotiations were
exceptionally bitter, described as “unusually contentious”166 and
“unique[ly] . . . unilateral and coercive”167 by prominent observers.
However, the haircut story has a second chapter. Though the nominal
haircut during the 2005 Exchange was unusually deep, Argentina’s bond
issuances in the 2005 and 2010 Exchanges included warranty payments
linked to the country’s future GDP growth. The GDP warrants provide that
bondholders receive payments when Argentina’s GDP growth exceeds
predefined annual benchmarks.168 In this way, the GDP-linked bonds
resembled equity shares in Argentina’s economy, which fared remarkably
well in years following the 2005 Exchange in large part due to robust
international demand for commodities like soy and grain as well as
automobile exports to Brazil.169
Holders of GDP-linked warrants saw dramatic gains in years following
the debt restructurings. As a result, Argentina’s haircut turned out to be
fairly close to average for a sovereign restructuring: returns on the GDPlinked warrants reduced Argentina’s haircut from roughly 77% to less than

161

Id.
See Bi et al., supra note 90, at 4.
163
Cruces & Trebesch, supra note 88, at 10–11.
164
Id.
165
See Bi et al., supra note 90, at 19 (characterizing Argentina’s restructuring as the “one major
exception” to modern sovereign debt restructuring trends).
166
Anna Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn From Argentina, 24 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 19, 19
(April 2005) (“It is hard to find a public or private sector participant who did not care or one who did
not feel deeply wronged.”).
167
DUGGAR, supra note 100.
168
See REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS DATED DEC. 27,
2004) S-64–66 (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/914021/ 0000950123
05000302/y04567e424b5.htm [hereinafter PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT].
169
See Miguel Kiguel, Argentina’s Debt: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, in THINK TANK 20: THE
G-20 AND CENTRAL BANKS IN THE NEW WORLD OF UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY 6 (2013)
(indicating that GDP-linked bonds have reduced Argentina’s haircut to less than 40%), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/08/g20%20central%20banks%20mone
tary%20policy/TT20%20central%20banks%20monetary%20policy%202.pdf.
162
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40%.170 Because the GDP warrants were given almost no value at the time
of the exchange negotiations, this gain for investors has been Argentina’s
loss. Between 2006 and 2013, the warrants have returned 43% a year.171
Payment caps on the GDP warrants limit the total amount that can be paid
to 48 cents on the dollar, which still allows for further reduction in the true
restructuring haircut. To date, Argentina has paid almost $10 billion under
the GDP warrants.172
Considering the scale and exceptional nature of Argentina’s default, it
may not be surprising that the duration of Argentina’s restructuring
negotiations was far longer than average as well. Forty months elapsed
before the 2005 Exchange—more than double the eighteen-month average
for a restructuring negotiation (Figure 3).173 Even more impressive, this
comparison does not consider time elapsed between the 2001 default and
the 2010 Exchange, which accounted for about 15% of the total bonds
exchanged.
Also outside the norm were the extent and formality of Argentina’s
measures to prohibit payments to holdout bondholders. While prioritization
of payments—or even nonpayments—is fairly common in sovereign debt,
measures like Argentina’s are rare. Leading up to the 2005 Exchange,
Argentina insisted that holdouts would remain excluded from future
payments on the defaulted bonds.174 These intentions were formally
acknowledged in the “rights upon future offers” (RUFO) clause of
Argentina’s restructuring prospectus, which assured exchange bondholders
that subsequent exchange offers would not contain superior terms to the
2005 Exchange.175 Government officials reinforced this position vowing
never to pay holdouts. But Argentina went further in passing Law 26017
known as la ley cerrojo (the Padlock Law), which prohibited the Argentine
executive from reopening an exchange offer with holdout creditors:
“Article 2 – The national Executive Branch may not, with respect to the
[holdout bounds], reopen the swap process established in the [2005
170
See STEPHANY GRIFFITH-JONES & DAGMAR HERTOVA, CESIFO DICE REPORT, GROWTHLINKED BONDS (2013), available at http://policydialogue.org/files/publications/CESifo_DICEReport_3-2013_Griffith-JonesHertova_Final_draft.pdf; see also Drew Benson & Boris Korby,
Argentina’s ‘Scorching’ Growth Helps GDP Warrants Trump Bonds on 28% Surge, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
10, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-10/argentina-s-scorching-growth-helpsgdp-warrants-trump-bonds-on-28-surge.html; Hilary Burke, Buy or Sell - Argentine GDP Warrants Still
Have Room to Grow?, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2010, 6:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2010/10/01/
buysell-argentina-gdpwarrants-idUSN0120720420101001.
171
See Charlie Devereux & Katia Porzecanski, Argentine GDP Warrants Plunge as Growth Misses
Trigger, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-28/argentinewarrant-holders-seen-losing-out-as-gdp-misses-forecast.html.
172
GRIFFITH-JONES & HERTOVA, supra note 170, at 36.
173
DUGGAR, supra note 100, at 4, 6.
174
See HORNBECK, supra note 13, at 5.
175
See PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 168, at S-69.
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Exchange offer].”176
Despite promises to the contrary, but in an effort to increase overall
restructuring participation, Argentina opened a second exchange offer in
April of 2010 (the 2010 Exchange) with substantially similar payment
terms as the 2005 Exchange. Argentina passed Law 26547 (the Padlock
Law Suspension),177 to temporarily suspend the Padlock Law and thus
enable the 2010 Exchange.178 Again, the 2010 Exchange prospectus
reinforced previous statements warning that nonexchange bonds could
remain in default indefinitely.179 The 2010 Exchange closed in December
of 2010 with roughly 67% participation among outstanding holders of
defaulted bonds, bringing Argentina from 76% to 91.3% in overall
exchange participation rate.180
E. Argentina as a Sovereign Defendant
Argentina has been no less exceptional at the dispute phase. Between
1976 and 2010, one study identified 108 sovereign debt cases against 25
sovereign debtors.181 Almost 88% of these cases were filed in the United
States, mainly in the Southern District of New York, underscoring the
importance of New York law for sovereign debt litigation.182 With 41 out
of 108 total cases, Argentina accounted for a weighty 37% of sovereign
debt cases filed between 1976 and 2013.183 As illustrated in Figure 5
below, the rest of the pack is far behind: Peru had 12, Iraq 4, and Nicaragua
4.184

176

See Law No. 26017, art. 2, Feb. 10, 2005, B.O. 30590 (Arg.).
Law 26547 reiterated that the Argentine government was prohibited from offering holdouts that
had initiated judicial action more favorable treatment than what has been offered to exchange
bondholders. See Law No. 26547, art. 1, Dec. 9, 2009, B.O. 31798 (Arg.).
178
Id.
179
See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251–53 (2d. Cir. 2012).
180
See HORNBECK, supra note 13, at 7.
181
See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 11.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
177
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Figure 5:
Number of Sovereign Debt Lawsuits,
1976–2010 Argentina (41)
All Others (47)
Peru (12)
Iraq (4)
Nicaragua (4)
Source: Schumacher, et al. (2013)

	
  Estimated volumes of litigation also illustrate the extraordinary nature
of Argentina’s sovereign debt situation. At $3.7 billion, Argentina’s
amount under litigation is approximately seventy-four times the average
claim of $50 million, as illustrated in Table 6.185 After Argentina, the next
largest amount litigated involved Brazil in the $1.4 billion CIBC v. Brazil
lawsuit.186 Even still, these samples only represent one component of
Argentina’s legal crisis: The Argentine government estimates as much as
$15 billion in holdout claims remain in default, including the $1.3 billion at
stake in NML.187 In addition to the sovereign debt litigation, Argentina
faced loan defaults188 and an avalanche of investment arbitration claims in
forums such as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes.189
Argentina has been a unique adversary to holdouts and plaintiffs.
Sovereigns are rarely eager to cooperate with vulture plaintiffs, but perhaps
no other government has taken such strong measures as Argentina to
prevent payments from reaching holdouts adversaries.190
Indeed,

185

See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 11–12.
CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
187
See Russo & Porzecanski, supra note 19, at 2.
188
See HORNBECK, supra note 118, at 2–3.
189
See Argentina Faces 65bn Dollars In Claims; Plans to Abandon International Litigations Court,
MERCOPRESS (Nov. 28, 2012, 8:28 PM), http://en.mercopress.com/ 2012/11/28/argentina-faces-65bn-dollarsin-claims-plans-to-abandon-international-litigations-court (“Argentina faces 42 claims at the World Bank’s
ICSID in which the plaintiffs are demanding compensations for almost 65 billion dollars . . . .”).
190
See Robin Wigglesworth & Jude Webber, Markets: An Unforgiven Debt, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012,
7:47 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/11558dc6-3888-11e2-bd7d-00144feabdc0.html (“Argentina’s obstinacy
also makes it an outlier in the history of sovereign restructurings.”).
186
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Argentina’s Padlock Law and prospectus statements are unusual for their
certainty, formality, and openly public nature.191
Clashing with creditors has its costs. Argentina has suffered
exceptionally harsh market penalties—yet another anomalous aspect of
Argentina’s situation.192 Typically, markets have fairly short memories;
sovereigns are usually readmitted to capital markets just two years after a
default.193
Argentina, however, remains essentially shunned from
international capital markets to date.194 This exclusion is largely associated
with its so-called “pariah” status due to Argentina’s ongoing disputes with
investors and creditors. As a result, the Fernández Kirchner government
has resorted to creative—but controversial and arguably unsustainable—
methods to raise capital.195
IV. THE NML DECISION
NML stems from Argentina’s 2001 default. While Argentina has made
all payments due on the exchange bonds following the 2005 and 2010
Exchanges, no payments were made on holdout bonds.196 Led by NML
Capital, a diverse coalition of holdout plaintiffs sued Argentina in the
Southern District of New York. The NML plaintiffs successfully argued
that Argentina violated the pari passu clause by paying the exchange
bondholders without paying holdout bondholders.197 The court’s holding
was possible because it found Argentina’s pari passu obligations required
ratable payments to all bondholders. Further, the court remedied this

191

See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251–53 (2d Cir. 2012).
The impact of the default has lasted much longer for Argentina, likely due to the nature and
length of the restructuring process as well as reputational damage. See Borensztein & Panizza, supra
note 94, at 22 (“Reputation of sovereign borrowers that fall in default, as measured by credit ratings and
spreads, is tainted, but only for a short time.”).
193
See id.
194
This outcome is consistent with findings of one recent study suggesting that deeper haircuts
result in harsher consequences for sovereigns. See Cruces & Trebesch, supra note 88; see also
MONETARY & CAPITAL MKT. DEP’T, IMF, A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES WITH EMERGING MARKET
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 19 (2012), available at www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/
2012/060512.pdf (“The case of Argentina perhaps remains the most extreme, where the country has not
been able to access the global markets since its 2001 default.”).
195
See HORNBECK, supra note 13, at 6 (“Argentina has met its financial needs by monetizing its
debt, placing bonds with domestic government agencies, restructuring domestically held debt, selling
bonds directly to the government of Venezuela, and nationalizing private pension funds”); see also
Argentina’s State-Owned Firms: So Far, Not So Good, ECONOMIST (May 12, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21554569.
196
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2012).
197
See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978(TPG), 2011 WL 9522565, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011).
192

76

_JD_Samples Final Read_1.24.15.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

3/12/15 7:53 AM

Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt
35:49 (2014)

breach by granting broad injunctive relief applicable to third parties.198
Plaintiffs won again on appeal when a unanimous panel of the Second
Circuit substantially affirmed the orders.199 In February 2014, Argentina
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court for review of
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Argentina’s pari passu obligations.
Review was denied in June 2014.200
This Part focuses on Argentina’s pari passu clause and the
significance of the NML decision in the broader context of a rogue trend
towards ratable payment injunctions in pari passu litigation. First, this Part
reviews the emergence of pari passu litigation and the competing
interpretations of the pari passu clause. Next, this Part analyzes the Second
Circuit’s approach to Argentina’s pari passu clause and the consequences
this approach has for judicial remedies.
A. Competing Interpretations of Pari Passu
The pari passu trend in sovereign debt litigation is the most recent and
potentially the most disruptive development to date. Although the erosion
of sovereign immunity since 1976 and the disposal of classic state defenses
during the 1980s–1990s made obtaining a judgment against a sovereign
more feasible, the challenge of collection remained constant. But with
rogue decisions in pari passu litigation, namely Elliott and NML, a critical
pillar of unenforceability is now under stress. In these cases, courts have
interpreted pari passu broadly enough to support a radical solution to
sovereign unenforceability—sweeping injunctive remedies applicable to
third parties.
Though the Latin phrase pari passu literally means “in equal step,”
which refers to equal footing among obligations, the exact meaning of the
clause in sovereign debt contracts remains unclear. A version of the pari
passu clause appears in most public and private international debt
instruments, including syndicated loans and bonds.201 Over time, and
perhaps somewhat inadvertently, the clause appears to have migrated from
secured cross-border private lending to unsecured sovereign debt lending.202
Historically, the pari passu covenant has been something of an
afterthought—a short boilerplate clause that rarely occupies more than two
sentences in complex, intensely negotiated credit instruments.203 The pari
198

Id. at *3.
See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d at 250.
200
See Russo & Porzecanski, supra note 19, at 1.
201
See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 25, at 906.
202
Id. at 875.
203
Id. at 920 (describing the pari passu clause as “an obscure boilerplate provision”); ALLEN &
OVERY, THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE AND THE ARGENTINE CASE 10 (2012), available at
199
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passu clause in Argentina’s 1994 Fiscal Agency Agreement, pursuant to
which the holdout bonds were issued, reads as follows:
The securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured
and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all
times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves.
The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities
shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and
future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.204
At the heart of the current pari passu controversy are two competing
interpretations of the clause: a “narrow” reading versus a “broad” or
“ratable payment” reading. Both sides of this debate were represented in
amicus briefs filed in NML.205 The broad reading of pari passu developed
through a handful of cases brought since 2000.206 This approach takes a
broad view of the scope of the pari passu covenant by interpreting the
second sentence of Argentina’s clause above to prohibit prioritizing other
“payment obligations” in making the payments themselves.207 Unlike the
narrow approach, the broad reading considers that prioritizing payments—
for instance, paying exchange bondholders but not holdouts—may
constitute a subordination of rank. Essentially, the broad reading extends
beyond formal, legal subordination to prohibit de facto subordination as
well.
Thus, the broad approach implies a requirement not only to maintain
legal rank equally, but also to make payments equally—or on a pro rata
basis—when a debtor is unable to pay all obligations in full. The pro rata
extension is especially critical because it provides legal grounds for the
injunctive relief, including court orders to third parties, seen in Elliott and
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20pari%20passu%20
clause%20and%20the%20Argentine%20case.pdf (“[T]he [pari passu] clause is generally regarded as
boilerplate without great force”); Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Republic of Argentina’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd.,
No. 12-1494, 2013 WL 3930517, at *7 (2013).
204
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d at 251.
205
For positions against the NML ratable payment interpretation of pari passu, see Salmon, supra
note 64 and accompanying text. For positions supporting the NML interpretation, see Brief for Amicus
Curiae Kenneth W. Dam in Support of Affirmance, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12105-cv(L), 2013 WL 100419 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (arguing in favor of ratable payment interpretation
of pari passu and third party injunctions); Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellees Urging Affirmance, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105cv(L), 2013 WL 210378 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013); Brief of Amici Curiae Italian Holders of Argentine
Sovereign Bonds in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No.
12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013).
206
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
207
See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d at 18–19.
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NML. This represents a drastic change in a sovereign’s options in debt
restructurings—namely the ability to prioritize payments, long considered a
privilege of sovereign borrowers.208 In effect, this interpretation prohibits a
sovereign from making payments on restructured bonds without paying
holdouts.
On the other hand, proponents of the narrow reading insist that the
pari passu obligations involve two prongs: one internal and the other
external.209 In other words, the first sentence of pari passu addresses
subordination within a bond issuance whereas the second sentence pertains
to changes in rank across all indebtedness.210 Key to the narrow
interpretation is the usage of the word “rank” in the second sentence, which
continues to mean “rank” rather than to “be paid.” Practically speaking, the
narrow reading affords scarce protection to creditors. Short of establishing
a “legal basis” for discrimination among creditors—for example the
Padlock Law—the narrow reading does not limit a sovereign’s ability to
prioritize payments.
As a result, while the narrow approach may forbid legal subordination
it does not prohibit a sovereign from making differential payments among
creditors. This understanding of a sovereign’s ability to prioritize payments
is supported by generations of prevailing practices and norms in sovereign
debt.211 The distinction between the broad ratable payment obligations and
the narrow prohibition on formal subordination is vital to the question of
remedies. Only a broad reading of Argentina’s pari passu obligations could
support the ratable payment injunctions prescribed by the court in NML.
B. The NML Approach to Pari Passu
Even if the Second Circuit’s opinion does not definitively embrace the
broad interpretation, the decisions certainly point in that direction. The
Second Circuit distanced itself from a definitive interpretation of
Argentina’s pari passu clause in its most recent opinion.212 Yet the court
upheld the ratable payment injunctions, which created an awkward and
uncertain gap in the opinion’s reasoning. In the Second Circuit’s view,
Argentina’s overall course of conduct—its “extraordinary behavior”—
amounted to a constructive subordination of the holdout bonds.213 More
specifically, the district court found subordination in (a) Argentina’s
208

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22; FMLC STUDY, supra note
28, at 5.
210
See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 3.
211
See Weidemaier, supra note 58, at 127.
212
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013).
213
Id.
209
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continuing payments to exchange bondholders and (b) legislation
prohibiting payments to holdouts, namely the Padlock Law and the Padlock
Law Suspension.214
Instead of committing to an interpretation of pari passu obligations,
the Second Circuit opted for ambiguity.215 Neither the district court nor the
appeals opinion clearly specified whether either action—prioritizing
payments or the Padlock Law—taken on its own would constitute
subordination. Under any interpretation of Argentina’s pari passu clause, a
formal legal subordination, such as the Padlock Law, would almost
certainly amount to a violation of the clause. Accordingly, Argentina’s
actions could probably be considered a breach of either the broad or the
narrow reading of the pari passu clause. The lack of clarity in the opinions
may reflect tension between a desire to hold Argentina to account and
awareness of the potentially awkward precedent.
A narrow view of pari passu in NML could have mitigated disruptive
consequences and uncertainties for sovereign debt markets. Sovereigns
rarely pass legislation similar to the Padlock Law. Such a holding would
have also put other sovereigns on notice that this kind of legislation could
breach pari passu obligations.216 But it was perhaps the question of
remedies that guided the Second Circuit away from the narrow reading of
pari passu. The court’s ratable payment injunctions prescribed by the court
depend on a broad reading of the pari passu clause.217 At least one
prominent observer wondered if the court, exasperated with Argentina’s
disregard for judicial authority, might have been grasping for a way to
punish the “recalcitrant” defendant.218
The court’s ratable payment injunctions forbid Argentina from making
payments to exchange bondholders without paying the plaintiff holdouts.
Expecting Argentina to defy its orders, the court aimed the injunctions
beyond Argentina to include third parties, including financial service
providers. The court’s injunctions cast a shockingly wide net: orders were
aimed at “all parties involved, directly or indirectly, in advising upon,
preparing, processing, or facilitating any payment of the Exchange
Bonds.”219 Essentially, having realized that Argentina would continue to
214
Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-CV-6978 (TPG), 2011 WL 9522565,
at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011).
215
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013).
216
See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 203, at 11.
217
See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.
218
Gelpern, Contract Hope, supra note 31; Floyd Norris, The Muddled Case of Argentine Bonds,
N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/ business/rulings-add-to-the-mess-inargentine-bonds.html (addressing complexities of the NML decision that “Judge Griesa seems not to
have understood”).
219
Order at 4, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 09-CV-01707 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
2012).
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defy judicial orders, the court decided to enforce its judgments against
innocent—yet likely compliant—third parties.220
In justifying these drastic remedies, the court found that “the equities
and the public interest strongly support issuance of equitable relief” to
prevent Argentina from further breach of its pari passu obligations.221
Without means to hold an unwilling sovereign to account, the court resorted
to drastic enforcement measures, which rely on an ambitious reading of
Argentina’s pari passu obligations. Facing limited enforcement options,
the temptation of these injunctions is understandable. However, the result
is a dramatic overcorrection for unenforceability—a highly complex one
with significant costs. It is difficult to imagine that sovereigns like
Argentina have been signing away generations of restructuring practices—
essentially promising not to restructure—with just two sentences of
ambiguous text. Crafting radical judicial remedies with small shreds of
ambiguous language seems overzealous, given the high stakes in a critical
area of law.
V. ROGUE TRENDS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT
Problems associated with rogue creditors and rogue debtors are widely
known and frequently discussed.222 Less visible, but no less important, is
the problem of rogue courts or rogue precedent in sovereign debt. Market
participants have long recognized this threat to orderly restructuring posed
by rogue courts.223 Cases like Elliott and NML illustrate the potential of
rogue precedent to produce unpredictable results and uncertainty for
sovereign debt markets. However, in recognizing NML’s extraordinary and
fact-driven nature, the Second Circuit provided ample grounds for other
courts to distinguish NML in future cases. Therefore, until broader
solutions for sovereign debt problems are implemented, other courts should
apply NML as narrowly as possible.
A. The Problem of Rogue Precedent
Opposition to the NML court’s interpretation of pari passu by the likes
220

The court was well aware of the likelihood that Argentina would continue to defy its orders. See,
e.g., Transcript of Hearing at 15, NML v. Argentina, Nos. 08-CV-6978 and 09-CV-1708 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 2012).
221
Id. at 2.
222
See Porzecanski, supra note 29; see also Fisch & Gentile, supra note 59.
223
See Gelpern, Building, supra note 84, at 1133 (“Even industry associations went on record to say
that rogue courts are a bigger danger to emerging market debt than rogue creditors.”) (citing EMTA,
POSITION REGARDING THE QUEST FOR MORE ORDERLY SOVEREIGN WORK-OUTS (2002), available at
http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/keymsg1.pdf).
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of the United States, France, and the IMF speaks volumes.224 For their part,
the United States and the IMF have serious reservations about Argentina’s
approach to international obligations since the 2001 default.225 Argentina
and the IMF have also been at odds over official statistics.226 Among other
debts and unsettled disputes, Argentina owed billions to the Paris Club.227
France, a key member of the Paris Club, overcame its concerns with
Argentina’s approach to international obligations in formally opposing
NML.228 Brazil and Mexico also raised concerns in separate amicus briefs
filed with the Supreme Court.229 In light of these concerns, it is remarkable
that all these parties are united—in certain terms and highly visible
fashion—against the NML approach to pari passu and injunctive remedies.
A primary concern among these parties is the impact of NML
precedent on the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt.230 Threats to
restructuring have serious adverse consequences not just for sovereign
debtors, but also for exchange creditors who participate in restructurings.231
Granting holdouts broad rights to recover in full undermines the fair sharing
of burden among sovereign creditors and the sovereign in distress. At the
224
For U.S. views, see supra note 22. For French views, see Brief for the Republic of France as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of Argentina’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Republic
of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., No. 12-1494 (July 26, 2013). For the IMF’s views, see IMF,
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK (2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/
2013/042613.pdf.
225
See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 1 (While the
United States does not condone Argentina’s actions in the international financial arena, Argentina’s
petition for rehearing en banc presents a “question of exceptional importance”); see also Joseph
Cotterill, The IMF Won’t be Argentina’s Pari Passu Frenemy. Why?, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE BLOG
(July 24, 2013, 4:17 AM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/ 2013/07/24/1579752/.
226
See Jude Webber, IMF Acts Over Flawed Argentine Economic Data, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2013,
11:15 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eb704c98-6cbe-11e2-953f-00144feab49a.html?siteedition=
intl#axzz2sD6MLLgr.
227
See Jude Webber, Argentina’s Debt: Quantified, FIN. TIMES BEYONDBRICS BLOG (Oct. 4, 2011,
10:43 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/10/04/argentina-much-more-indebted-that-you-think
/#axzz2sCuR8Wva; see also Pablo Gonzalez, Argentina Submits Offer to Paris Club for $10 Billion
Debt, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-20/argentina-seesagreement-on-10-billion-debt-with-paris-club.html.
228
See Anna Gelpern, France is Man Enough to Pari Passu, CREDIT SLIPS (Jul. 27, 2013, 7:59
AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/07/france-is-man-enough-to-pari-passu.html (“Like
the United States and the IMF, the Paris Club is mad-mad-mad at Argentina for failing to repay billions
of dollars, but France is evidently more worried about the impact of the Second Circuit decision on debt
restructuring and the rest of the Paris Club business”).
229
See Anthony Harrup & Shane Romig, Mexico Backs Argentina in Dispute with Bond Holdouts,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023046881
04579463771537655770.
230
See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 4–5; see also
Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae, supra note 224, at 10–17.
231
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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same time, this approach reduces incentives for participation in
restructuring and creates serious uncertainties for financial market service
providers.
The Second Circuit brushed these concerns aside rather summarily,
concluding that the collective action clauses (CACs) will prevent holdout
situations like this in the future.232 Unfortunately, the court’s position
depends on an overly optimistic view of the ability of CACs to resolve
holdout issues in the future. CACs were introduced to sovereign bonds
governed by New York law with Mexico’s adoption of a CAC in a 2003
bond issuance.233 CACs limit the ability of a minority of bondholders to
derail a restructuring by allowing a majority—usually 75%—of
bondholders to make restructuring decisions across an entire issuance.234
Properly drafted, CACs offer a significant improvement over unanimity
action clauses, especially for bonds with atomized holders. In theory,
CACs alleviate coordination and collective action problems common in
sovereign debt restructurings.235
However, prevailing practices tell a different story than the Second
Circuit’s understanding of the CAC solution. For one, many outstanding
sovereign bonds simply do not have CACs.236 Another problem is that
many CACs bind only bondholders within a particular issuance.
Sovereigns often have multiple issuances. An outside investor could buy in
at just over 25%—conceivably, at a relatively modest price—of just one
issuance to block a restructuring. Indeed, holdout creditors recently
blocked Greece’s restructuring of a substantial chunk of debt in spite of
CACs.237 Aggregation clauses mitigate the cross-issuance problems to an
extent, but they are not yet in wide use.238 Contrary to the Second Circuit’s
understanding, contractual drafting in sovereign bonds has not yet evolved
to address legal gaps in the sovereign debt system.

232

NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247–48 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013).
Id. at 248.
234
There are two primary categories of CACs. Modification clauses allow a predefined majority of
holders in a series of bonds to bind other holders in that series to an agreement to restructure the entire
series. Acceleration clauses prevent individual bondholders from demanding full payment upon default
by requiring a bondholder vote to approve the demand. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, A
People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 53 (2013).
235
Id.
236
See Declaration of Stephen Choi at 26, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-CV6978 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2012) (noting that “65 or 25.3% of New York law governed bond issuances
with a maturity date of 2013 or later employ a [unanimity action clauses] for changes to payment related
terms”).
237
See IMF, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING, supra note 224, at 28.
238
See Declaration of Stephen Choi, supra note 236, at 10.
233
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B. Drastic Measures are Undesirable
Drastic measures like the injunctive remedies in NML offer a tempting
fix for unenforceability. Courts are understandably reluctant to appear
hapless when dealing with a “recalcitrant” sovereign. But injunctive
remedies overcorrect for unenforceability and shift burdens to third parties.
Though satisfying in some respects, the costs outweigh the benefits.
Furthermore, drastic overcorrections threaten to disrupt the broader
sovereign debt system, creating undesirable costs for various nonrogue
actors in the market.
The dysfunctionality of the sovereign debt system is exaggerated by a
small handful of high profile restructuring failures, namely Peru and
Argentina. Unfortunately, it is precisely these outlier situations that have
led to rogue precedent on sovereign debt, namely Elliott and NML. The
vast majority of sovereign debt restructurings proceed in orderly fashion.
Even though sovereign debt litigation is on the rise, few defaults trigger a
wave of lawsuits.239 Between 1976 and 2013, just twenty-nine of 176
restructurings were followed by litigation.240 And only Argentina’s
restructuring resulted in persistent holdout litigation. Those that do trigger
waves of litigation—again, Argentina and Peru—account for the lion’s
share of total volumes.241
In addition to low rates of incidence, the weight of claims also remains
relatively low. IMF economist Manmohan Singh once suggested that
vultures might be more aptly named “mosquitos,” based on their actual
import.242 Though pesky and irritating, amounts litigated are relatively
small compared to the total amounts restructured. In a sample of 108 cases,
the amounts litigated averaged 3.6% of total the amounts restructured with
a median of just 1.7%.243 Even the record-smashing litigation against
Argentina represents just 4.5% of the original amount of Argentina’s 2001
default, though this number could increase significantly as non-NML
plaintiff holdouts come forward.244
To be sure, the existing regime—or lack thereof—for sovereign debt is
an imperfect system. Governing the sovereign ungovernable is a difficult
task for courts. But, even as incomplete as the existing system is, it works
most of the time. For all their righteous indignation about sanctity of
contract and creditors rights, sovereign debt holdouts may not be as
239
See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 11 (Observing that “runs” on the courthouse only
happened in two situations: Argentina and Peru).
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
A Victory by Default?, supra note 71.
243
Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 12.
244
See Russo & Porzecanski, supra note 19.
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victimized as they would like to appear. On average, sovereign debt
haircuts are much less drastic than corporate loan and debt restructurings—
despite the vast leverage supposedly possessed by sovereigns.245 In the
United States, debtor-friendly provisions in bankruptcy law often leave
unpaid creditors or pension haircuts for workers in the wake of
insolvency.246 Less sympathetic is indignation among hedge funds that buy
in at heavily discounted prices to gamble for full recovery through judicial
relief.
While the need for a sovereign debt insolvency mechanism is clear,
potential solutions remain highly incomplete.247 Unfortunately, a recent
spasm of case law relying on strained—if not simply mistaken—readings of
pari passu combined with supercharged injunctive remedies threatens
further aggravation of an already imperfect system. In addition to
overinflating incentives to holdout, NML also weakens incentives for
participation in sovereign debt exchanges. Rogue precedent creates serious
uncertainty for sovereigns, their creditors, and even third parties in the
financial system such as trustees, clearing houses, and payments systems.248
C. Applying NML Narrowly
In light of NML’s outlier facts across the various stages of sovereign
debt—as a debtor, as a sovereign in crisis, as a negotiating sovereign in
default, and as a defendant—there are ample grounds to consider the NML
precedent narrowly. NML is an unsuitable point of departure for creating
highly disruptive precedent in a critical area of law for sovereign debt.
Amplifying the gravity of the NML precedent, a majority of emerging
market sovereign bonds issued internationally are subject to New York law
and most sovereign debt litigation is brought in the Southern District of
New York.249 Further, many outstanding sovereign bonds contain pari
passu clauses like Argentina’s. Sovereign bonds are frequently long-term
instruments with maturities measured in decades.
Unfortunately,
contractual innovations like CACs lag behind contemporary problems in
sovereign debt.250
245

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Chris Christoff, Detroit Manager Outlines Pension-Cut Plans for Workers, BLOOMBERG (June 21,
2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-20/detroit-manager-orders-probe-of-benefit-programs-1.html (discussing reactions to haircuts for workers and bondholders in Detroit’s restructuring); Detroit
Creditors Brace for Haircuts, or Worse, at Meeting to Avoid Bankruptcy, REUTERS (June 14, 2013, 12:00
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/usa-detroit-creditors-idUSL2N0EN20520130614
(highlighting the leverage of a debtor heading towards Chapter 9 bankruptcy vis-á-vis creditors).
247
See Gelpern, Quasi-Sovereign, supra note 83; Gelpern, Bankruptcy, supra note 83.
248
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
249
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
250
See supra notes 57, 224, 234, 236 and accompanying text.
246
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In its August 23, 2012 opinion, the Second Circuit wisely recognized
the uncomfortable reality facing the court. The opinion recognized the
extraordinary and fact-driven nature of NML—distancing the decision from
potentially disruptive and awkward precedent:
But this case is an exceptional one with little apparent bearing on
transactions that can be expected in the future. Our decision here
does not control the interpretation of all pari passu clauses or the
obligations of other sovereign debtors under pari passu clauses in
other debt instruments. As we explicitly stated in our last
opinion, we have not held that a sovereign debtor breaches its
pari passu clause every time it pays one creditor and not another,
or even every time it enacts a law disparately affecting a
creditor’s rights. We simply affirm the district court’s conclusion
that Argentina’s extraordinary behavior was a violation of the
particular pari passu clause found in the FAA.251
In recognizing the extraordinary nature of NML, the Second Circuit
provided grounds to apply the NML precedent narrowly. Other courts
should consider this message from the Second Circuit as a starting point for
distinguishing NML from future sovereign debt cases. Though a holding
based on a decisive interpretation of pari passu would have supplied more
clarity, the Second Circuit’s language at least provides grounds for
mitigating the NML precedent until more permanent solutions for sovereign
insolvency emerge.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although the Second Circuit partially recognized the “exceptional”
circumstances of this case, the NML situation is exceptional across all
phases of sovereign debt. Faced with bad facts, NML has already created
bad law. But other courts can mitigate the fallout by distinguishing this
case from others until broader sovereign debt solutions are available. There
are ample and compelling grounds to apply NML narrowly. Cases like
Elliott and NML underscore the dangerous temptation facing courts to
overcorrect for unenforceability in sovereign debt litigation.
Until
contractual innovations or institutional solutions catch up with the rogue
trends in sovereign debt, it is likely these temptations will persist.252
251

NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2012).
Contractual solutions set forth by the International Capital Market Association, including a modified pari
passu clause and more robust aggregated CACs are a good starting point. See Sovereign Debt Information, INT’L
CAP. MKT. ASS’N, http://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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